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Research on embodied approaches to language comprehension suggests that we under-
stand linguistic descriptions of actions by mentally simulating these actions. Evidence is
provided by the action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE) which shows that sensibility
judgments for sentences are faster when the direction of the described action matches
the response direction. In two experiments, we investigated whether the ACE relies on
actions or on intended action effects. Participants gave sensibility judgments of auditorily
presented sentences by producing an action effect on a screen at a location near the body
or far from the body. These action effects were achieved by pressing a response button
that was located in either the same spatial direction as the action effect, or in the oppo-
site direction.We used a go/no-go task in which the direction of the to-be-produced action
effect was either cued at the onset of each sentence (Experiment 1) or at different points in
time before and after sentence onset (Experiment 2). Overall, results showed a relationship
between the direction of the described action and the direction of the action effect. Further-
more, Experiment 2 indicated that depending on the timing between cue presentation and
sentence onset, participants responded either faster when the direction of the described
action matched the direction of the action effect (positive ACE), or slower (negative ACE).
These results provide evidence that the comprehension of action sentences involves the
activation of representations of action effects. Concurrently activated representations in
sentence comprehension and action planning can lead to both priming and interference,
which is discussed in the context of the theory of event coding.
Keywords: action-sentence compatibility, language comprehension, motor simulation, action simulation, embod-
iment
INTRODUCTION
EMBODIED LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
Imagine that a friend who plays football tells you that she has
scored a goal. While listening to her report, you vicariously expe-
rience the described events. You “see” the shot in your mind’s
eye, and if you have your own experiences with playing football,
you probably “feel” the movement of kicking the ball. We are all
familiar with this kind of vicarious experience of a described sit-
uation not only from conversations, but also from reading stories
when we feel as if the events occurring in the story happened to
ourselves.
This kind of vicarious experience is what the proponents
of embodied approaches to language comprehension (Barsalou,
1999; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan, 2004; Pulvermüller,
2005) call mental simulation of the described situation, and it is
regarded as essential for capturing the meaning of an utterance.
According to the embodied view, words and sentences reactivate
memory traces from actual experiences with the denoted objects,
events, or actions in the person trying to comprehend the words
or sentences. These perceptual and action representations enter
into a mental simulation that is constructed during language
comprehension. Empirical evidence for those assumptions stems
particularly from studies on action-related language. Here it is
assumed that the comprehension of action-related language relies
on action simulation, that is, on the reactivation of stored motor
experiences.
An embodied approach to language comprehension may have
important implications for the role of conscious awareness in
action processing. This is because an approach like this challenges
the classical distinction between explicit, declarative knowledge
about action (as is involved in representations of action-related
words and sentences) and implicit, procedural knowledge for
action (as is involved in motor representations for action con-
trol). Challenging this distinction is, to some extent, tantamount to
challenging that there is a functional separation between conscious
and non-conscious modes of action processing. Common opinion
holds that processing of declarative knowledge is (mandatorily)
conscious whereas processing of procedural knowledge does not
require conscious awareness (Squire, 1992; Balota et al., 2000; Tul-
ving, 2000; Baddeley, 2002). If so, the claim that one is grounded
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in the other seems to imply that conscious and non-conscious
processing modes draw on common representational resources
and are, in functional terms, less different than is often claimed
and believed.
EVIDENCE FORMOTOR SIMULATIONS IN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
Neurophysiological and brain imaging studies have indicated that
motor system activation is involved in semantic access to the
meaning of action words. For instance, comprehension of sen-
tences describing actions performed with the mouth, hand, or leg
engages motor circuits that largely overlap with those activated
during execution and observation of the described actions (Tet-
tamanti et al., 2005). Further, changes in motor excitability are
specific for the effector involved in the described action (Buc-
cino et al., 2005). When the arm’s motor area is stimulated, words
referring to arm actions are recognized faster than words refer-
ring to leg actions, and the opposite pattern occurs when the leg’s
motor area is stimulated (Pulvermüller et al., 2005). In addition,
processing of action verbs at the onset of reaching movements
affects the kinematics of the movements 160–180 ms after word
onset (Boulenger et al., 2006). At this time, early lexico-semantic
processes are known to occur (Sereno et al., 1998). Even when
action verbs are only displayed subliminally while participants
prepare a reaching movement, they affect motor preparation and
subsequent movement kinematics (Boulenger et al., 2008).
On the behavioral level, studies show content-specific interac-
tions between the understanding of a verbally described action and
a concurrently performed motor response. Usually these interac-
tions reflect a facilitated execution of the motor response when
the response shares some features with the semantic meaning
of the action-related words and sentences presented as stimuli.
An example of such an interaction is the action-sentence com-
patibility effect (ACE; Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002), which refers
to compatibility between the direction of a described action and
the direction of the response. In ACE experiments, participants
judge whether sentences describing actions toward or away from
the body, such as “Courtney handed you the notebook” or “You
handed Courtney the notebook,” are sensible or not. Participants
perform the judgment by moving the hand from a home button
in the center of a response device to either a button closer to their
body (near button, movement toward the body) or to a button
further away from the body (far button, movement away from the
body). Several studies have shown that when the movement direc-
tion for the response is compatible with the movement direction
expressed in the sentence, e.g., when both are directed away from
the body, response times are faster than when movement direc-
tions are incompatible (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Borreggine
and Kaschak, 2006; Glenberg et al., 2008b; Kaschak and Borreg-
gine, 2008). A similar compatibility effect has been observed for
verbally described directions of manual rotations (e.g., opening a
water bottle) and rotation directions that were produced by turn-
ing a knob (Zwaan and Taylor, 2006). Zwaan et al. (2012) found
that the response execution was modulated even when there was no
feature overlap between responses and verbally described move-
ments. Participants were presented with sentences that implied
a forward or backward movement and although response move-
ments involved leaning to the left or right on a balance board, these
movements were shifted forward or backward depending on the
sentence content.
THE NATURE OF THE INVOLVED ACTION REPRESENTATIONS
Based on those and similar behavioral and neurophysiological
studies, embodied theories of language comprehension, such as
the theory of perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999), or
the indexical hypothesis (Glenberg and Robertson, 1999, 2000),
assume that linguistic contents evoke multimodal representations
of their referents. In their view, language reactivates experiences
that were encoded and stored by different modality-specific sys-
tems. In the case of action words or sentences, the motor system
partially reactivates the motor state that produces the denoted
action, thereby creating a simulation of that action (Barsalou,
2003). Thus, action representations activated during language
comprehension are supposed to refer to specific motor programs.
In spite of the considerable body of evidence for the involve-
ment of motor programs in understanding action-related lan-
guage, it is conceivable that another kind of action representation
is also involved. Based on assumptions of the common coding
approach (Prinz, 1990, 1997), representations of described actions
could be coded in terms of action goals or action effects. Prinz’s
approach proposes that perceived events and planned actions are
coded in a common representational format. This common cod-
ing of perception and action is thought to result from actions
being represented in terms of their perceptual consequences or
intended action effects (Prinz, 1990; for evidence see, e.g., Elsner
and Hommel, 2001; Rieger, 2007). Support for this assumption
comes from stimulus-effect compatibility effects. For instance,
Hommel (1993) demonstrated that response times are faster when
participants respond to a stimulus which has a spatial compatibil-
ity to an intended action effect (e.g., both are on the left side),
regardless of whether the intended action effect was produced by
a spatially compatible or non-compatible action (i.e., by pressing
a right or left key).
Some studies have already indicated that interactions between
language processing and actions can occur on the level of intended
action effects. Markman and Brendl (2005) found that responses
to positive words were facilitated when producing an action effect
with a positive connotation (approaching the participant’s name
on the screen) compared to producing an action effect with a neg-
ative connotation (withdrawing from the participant’s name, i.e.,
avoidance action). This compatibility effect was independent of
whether the action effect resulted from moving the arm toward
or away from the body. In this case, priming occurred because
representations of emotional words and response representations
shared affective codes on the level of action effects (see also Eder
and Klauer, 2007, 2009; Eder and Rothermund, 2008; van Dantzig
et al., 2008). Lindemann et al. (2006) showed that semantic pro-
cessing of words was facilitated when the words denoted the goal
of an action that was prepared before. Thus, the activated action
goal primed the word meaning, which again suggests common
codes that represent the intended action effects.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The experiments investigating compatibility effects between lan-
guage comprehension and concurrent action, so far, either have
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not clearly differentiated between the representations of actions
and intended action effects or they only used affective word stimuli
(like Markman and Brendl, 2005). Therefore, it is unclear to what
extent the comprehension of sentences is based on representations
of intended action effects or on motor representations.
Our experiments addressed this question by testing whether
action representations activated during sentence comprehension
interact with representations of intended effects of actions or with
representations of the motor component of these actions. We
asked participants to indicate whether sentences describing actions
toward or away from the body were sensible or not. The sentences
expressed transfer of concrete or abstract objects between the par-
ticipant and another person. Participants were asked to perform
the judgment by producing an action effect (lighting a star on a
horizontally mounted screen) at a location either near the body
or far from the body. These action effects were achieved by mov-
ing the hand from a centrally located button to a button located
nearer to or further away from the body. In order to dissociate
actions from their intended effects, participants performed the
task with either a regular spatial relationship between actions and
the intended effects (e.g., combining a movement to the near but-
ton with an action effect located near the body) or with an inverted
spatial relationship between actions and effects (e.g., combining
a movement to the near button with an action effect located far
from the body).
We looked at sentence-effect compatibility, that is, the com-
patibility between the direction of the action described in the
sentence (object transfer toward or away from the body) and the
direction of the intended action effect (a star appearing on the
screen at a location near the body or far from the body). If repre-
sentations of intended action effects play a role in understanding
action-related language, responses should be faster in the sentence-
effect compatible condition than in the sentence-effect incompat-
ible condition. This pattern of results (an action effect-related
ACE) should be observed both in regular and in inverted con-
ditions. If, however, representations of the motor component of
actions predominantly contribute to the understanding of action-
related language, compatibility should be effective between the
sentence direction and the direction of the arm movement to the
response button (movement-related ACE). In this case, different
patterns should be observed in the regular and inverted condi-
tion: in the regular action-effect relation condition in which the
directions of actions and action effects are completely correlated,
responses should be faster in the sentence-effect compatible condi-
tion than in the sentence-effect incompatible condition. This pat-
tern should reverse in the inverted action-effect relation condition.
Because sentence-effect compatibility is equivalent to sentence-
action incompatibility in the inverted condition, the reversed
ACE pattern means that responses are faster with sentence-action
compatibility than sentence-action incompatibility.
The question of whether the ACE is related to the arm move-
ment or to the intended action effect might be answered differently
for concrete and abstract sentences. Understanding concrete sen-
tences might involve activation of specific motor programs and
hence give rise to a movement-related ACE, whereas understand-
ing abstract sentences might involve activation of representations
of action effects and therefore lead to an action effect-related ACE.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 investigated whether the comprehension of action
sentences relies on actions or on intended action effects by disso-
ciating actions from their intended effects in an ACE paradigm.
We wanted participants to be aware of the locations of the to-be-
produced action effect and avoid participants adapting to certain
movements when judging sentences. Therefore, we varied ran-
domly whether the response required producing an action effect
at the near or the far location. In order to keep the task as easy as
possible, we adopted the go/no-go method from Borreggine and
Kaschak’s (2006) ACE experiments, in which participants only
responded when they judged sentences to be sensible. Participants
were informed about the current location of the to-be-produced
action effect by a visual cue at the onset of every sentence, sim-
ilar to a condition in which Borreggine and Kaschak found the
standard ACE.
METHOD
Participants
Nineteen adults were paid 7 Euros to participate in the experiment.
The data from three participants were excluded from analyses
for reasons explained later in the data analysis section. Thus, the
final sample comprised 16 participants (mean age= 24.8 years; 6
males, 10 females). All participants were native German speakers,
right-handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
audition. They were randomly assigned to two groups contain-
ing eight participants each. One group performed the task in the
regular action-effect relation condition, while the second group
performed the task in the inverted action-effect relation condition.
Stimuli and apparatus
The linguistic material comprised 80 triads of sentences that were
adopted from Glenberg et al. (2008b) and translated into German.
Each triad consisted of three versions of an action sentence: the
two critical sentences of each triad described the same transfer
action directed either toward the body (e.g., “Jakob reicht dir das
Buch” [Jacob hands you the book]), or away from the body (e.g.,
“Du reichst Jakob das Buch”[You hand Jacob the book]). The third
sentence contained the same character names and objects as the
transfer sentences, but a different verb that expressed no trans-
fer (e.g., “Du liest mit Jakob das Buch” [You read the book with
Jacob]). Half of these neutral sentences began with the German
word “Du” [you], like the away sentences, and half began with a
character name, like the toward sentences. In addition, half of the
triads described the concrete transfer of objects (as in the examples
above), and half described abstract transfer, for example, the trans-
fer of information (e.g., “Julia erzählt dir eine Geschichte” [Julia
tells you the story]). Half the sentences (40 triads) were sensible
and half were nonsensical. Twenty additional sentences were cre-
ated and served as practice items. All sentences were recorded by
a female German speaker and presented over headphones during
the experiment.
The response device (see Figure 1) consisted of three buttons
(diameter: 6.3 cm) that were arranged in a vertical line on a board.
The distance between the center of the middle button and the cen-
ters of the near and far button was 11.3 cm. The board was located
on a table in front of the participant so that the buttons differed in
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of response fields and cue (A) and of arm movement and its effect by the example of a “yes” response in the yes-is-near
condition with regular action-effect relation (B) and with inverted action-effect relation (C).
distance from the participant’s body. The near button was about
20 cm away from the body. Above the buttons, a 17′′ flat screen
monitor was mounted horizontally. On the screen, two response
fields were presented on a black background. One of the fields
appeared at a near location (subtending a visual angle of 6.6˚) and
one at a far location (visual angle of 3.1˚). The distance between
the centers of the response fields was identical to the distance
between the centers of the outer response buttons (i.e., 22.6 cm).
One response field had a blue frame and the other one was framed
in yellow; both fields were black inside. To indicate that a sentence
was sensible participants were asked to activate a given response
field by pressing the near or far button. The color (blue or yel-
low) of a cross (1.8˚ of visual angle) served as a cue to indicate the
response field that had to be activated. As an effect of the button
press, a star flashed in place of the activated response field on the
screen. The effect star had the same color as the activated response
field and subtended a visual angle of 16.2˚ (near location) or 7.7˚
(far location). To increase attention to the visual response effect,
a sound (“twinkles”) was presented at the same time as the star
appeared. The sound was composed of two successively presented
tones that formed a fourth upward (with fundamental frequencies
of 625 and 834 Hz).
Because the screen was placed above the buttons, the mov-
ing hand was covered and, thus, participants received no on-line
visual feedback of their movement, but only perceived its effect on
the screen. The experiment was controlled by an IBM-compatible
computer running Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Sys-
tems, Albany, USA), and the response buttons were connected to
it via the parallel port.
Procedure and design
The experiment was run in a dimly illuminated and sound-
attenuated room. Each trial was initiated by pressing the middle
button with the right hand, and participants were told not to
release this button until they were able to make their response.
Five-hundred milliseconds after the button press, the blue and the
yellow response fields appeared on the screen at the near and far
location and 1000 ms after their appearance, the auditory presen-
tation of a sentence started. Participants were instructed to decide
if the presented sentence was sensible or not. As a go/no-go task
was used, participants were asked to respond only when the sen-
tence was sensible (yes response), and to refrain from responding
to a nonsense sentence. The yes response was randomly assigned
to either the near response field (yes-is-near condition) or to
the far response field (yes-is-far condition). When the sentence
presentation started, the response cue (a cross) appeared in the
center of the screen matching the color of one of the response
fields. The color of the cue indicated whether the near or the far
response field should be activated if the sentence was sensible.
Activating the response fields required moving one’s arm from
the middle button to the near or far button, that is, toward the
body or away from the body. Participants were asked to give the
yes response as soon as the sensibility of the sentence could be
decided, thereby responding as quickly and accurately as possible.
In case a response occurred, a star flashed and the accompanying
sound was presented as soon as one of the response buttons was
pressed. The star replaced the response field on the screen. The cue
remained visible until the response was made or, in the case of a
sentence being judged as nonsensical and no response being given,
until the trial timed out 5 s after sentence onset. The sequence of
trial events is illustrated in Figure 2.
There were two different mappings of action effects to buttons
(see Figure 1 for an illustration): in the condition with the regular
action-effect relation, actions and action effects were completely
correlated, which means that the location of the to-be-produced
action effect on the screen corresponded with the location of the
button press (i.e., both were near the body or both were far from
the body). In contrast, the action and its effect were opposed in the
condition with the inverted action-effect relation: an action effect
at a certain location on the screen resulted from moving one’s arm
in the opposite direction (i.e., the star appeared at the near location
on the screen when pressing the far button and vice versa).
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received two
blocks of practice trials. The first block consisted of 32 trials in
which participants were familiarized with the response assign-
ment. They were only presented with the German words “Ja” [yes]
and “Nein” [no]. In the yes trials they were asked to activate the
response field that was indicated by the visual response cue, in the
no trials they were asked to refrain from responding. Feedback
about the correctness of the response was provided by display-
ing the German word “Richtig” [right], colored green, or “Falsch”
[wrong], colored red, on the screen. In the second practice block,
participants received 20 trials with practice sentences. The two
response assignments were each presented in one half of the trials.
The whole experiment lasted approximately 30 min.
Apart from action-effect relation (regular, inverted), which was
manipulated between participants, all of the independent variables
were manipulated within participants. Sentence direction (toward,
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FIGURE 2 | Sequence of events in an experimental trial of Experiment 1. This trial gives an example of a sensible away sentence presented in the yes-is-far
condition.
away, and neutral), sentence type (concrete and abstract), sensi-
bility (sensible and nonsensical), and effect direction (yes-is-near,
yes-is-far) varied from trial to trial.
To ensure that all sentences appeared equally often in every con-
dition, the 240 stimulus sentences were divided into two material
blocks which were assigned to one of the effect directions each. In
each trial, a sentence was selected randomly from one of the two
material blocks. The assignment of material blocks to conditions
of effect direction and action-effect relation was counterbalanced
across participants. Sentences were randomized in such a way that
each material block was divided into five subblocks (24 sentences
each) that contained an equal number of sentences of each cat-
egory (sensibility, sentence type, sentence direction), but never
included sentences that belonged to the same triad. For each par-
ticipant, the order of sentences in each subblock, as well as the
order of the subblocks themselves, was randomized.
Data analysis
In both Experiments 1 and 2, participants were removed from the
analysis and replaced by a new participant (a) when their error
rates exceeded 15% or (b) when participants had their hand rest-
ing on the middle button and only pressed the response buttons
with fingers splayed out in more than 15% of the trials, despite
being instructed to move the whole hand from the middle button
to the response button. These cases were identified through ear-
lier registration of response button presses than the release of the
middle button.
Dependent variables were total response time (TRT)1 and per-
centages of errors. TRT was measured from the onset of sentence
1Preliminary data inspection indicated that participants may not have always
selected the response before releasing the middle button (i.e., short response times,
RTs), but instead made the decision to press the near or the far button only when
they had already initiated the movement. In such instances, response preparation
occurs partly during movement time (MT, time from releasing the middle button to
pressing the response button) and compatibility effects correspondingly shift from
presentation to the pressing of the near or far response button.
Incorrect trials were excluded from the analysis. To reduce the
effect of outliers, first, 0.5% of the longest and shortest responses
over participants were eliminated, and second, for each participant
in each condition, responses that deviated more than 2.5 SD from
the condition mean were discarded. This procedure was based on
the trimming procedure used by Glenberg et al. (2008b).
Only data from the sensible toward and away sentences were
analyzed (see Glenberg et al., 2008b). In order to simplify the
analysis and to make the data more easily accessible, the vari-
ables sentence direction and effect direction were merged into a
new variable, sentence-effect compatibility (compatible, incom-
patible). The sentence-effect compatible condition always con-
tained cases in which effect direction matched the sentence direc-
tion, irrespective of the direction of the arm movement required
for the response. The sentence-effect incompatible condition
included cases in which effect direction and sentence direction
were opposed.
Three-way mixed-factor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were
conducted on TRTs and error rates with sentence-effect compat-
ibility (compatible, incompatible) and sentence type (concrete,
abstract) as within-subjects factors and with action-effect relation
(regular, inverted) as a between-subjects factor. Since compatibility
effects are the main interest of this work, only main effects of and
interactions with sentence-effect compatibility will be reported.
RESULTS
Total response time
The trimming procedure applied to the data from the final sample
resulted in the elimination of 4.8% of the TRT data. A signifi-
cant main effect of sentence-effect compatibility [F(1, 14)= 4.67,
MSE= 1344.46, p= 0.049] and a significant interaction between
RTs to MTs. We therefore decided to analyze total response time (TRT), the sum of
RT and MT.
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sentence-effect compatibility, sentence type, and action-effect rela-
tion [F(1, 14)= 6.73, MSE= 843.77, p= 0.02] were found (see
Figure 3 for mean TRTs). Further ANOVAs, performed sepa-
rately for each sentence type, revealed that responses to concrete
sentences were faster across action-effect relations in the sentence-
effect incompatible condition (M = 2034, SD= 144) than in the
sentence-effect compatible condition [M = 2056, SD= 167; F(1,
14)= 4.59, MSE= 851.22, p= 0.05]. This was not modified by
an interaction between sentence-effect compatibility and action-
effect relation [F(1, 14)= 0.92, MSE= 851.22]. In contrast, for
abstract sentences a significant interaction between sentence-
effect compatibility and action-effect relation was observed [F(1,
14)= 4.63, MSE= 1337.0,p= 0.049]. When the action-effect rela-
tion was inverted, responses were faster in the sentence-effect
incompatible condition compared to the sentence-effect com-
patible condition [t (7)= 2.98, p= 0.02]. No significant differ-
ence was found in the regular action-effect relation condition
[t (7)=−0.49]. In sum, TRTs for concrete sentences showed a
sentence-effect compatibility disadvantage (negative ACE) that
was not modulated by action-effect relation, and TRTs for
abstract sentences displayed a sentence-effect compatibility dis-
advantage only in the condition with inverted action-effect
relation.
Effects of response speed on the ACE
The observation of a negative ACE was surprising, particularly
since we followed the procedure by Borreggine and Kaschak
(2006) that yielded a positive ACE. However, Borreggine and
Kaschak manipulated the timing of response planning in their
ACE experiments. When the response cue that informed par-
ticipants of the movement direction was presented at the onset
of the sentence, the response could be planned while the sen-
tence was processed. In this condition, a positive ACE arose. In
contrast, when the cue appeared after the offset of the sentence,
which prevented participants from preparing the response dur-
ing sentence processing, responses were slower and the ACE
was eliminated and descriptively showed a tendency to be
reversed.
The negative ACE in the current experiment could result
from participants not immediately paying attention to the
response cue when it appeared on the screen. Since the cue
was visible throughout the whole sentence presentation, there
may have been a tendency for participants to postpone pro-
cessing of the cue and response preparation to the end of
the sentence. In this way, our experiment may have corre-
sponded to Borreggine and Kaschak’s (2006) condition with
delayed cue presentation, in which the ACE started to become
negative. Thus, different timings between response prepara-
tion and sentence comprehension might be responsible for this
result.
In order to investigate whether this might be the case, we
used participants’ mean TRTs of all correct trials containing sen-
sible toward and away sentences to obtain a measure reflecting
how fast each participant responded on average. Fast responses
may reflect relatively early response preparation, whereas slow
responses may reflect relatively late response preparation. We
repeated the ANOVA described above with participants’ speed
as an additional covariate. The analysis revealed a significant
interaction between sentence-effect compatibility and speed [F(1,
13)= 12.53, MSE= 737.24, p= 0.004]. To clarify the nature of
this interaction, we correlated participants’ speed (i.e., their mean
TRTs) with the magnitude of the ACE (difference between TRTs for
sentence-effect incompatible trials and TRTs for sentence-effect
compatible trials, i.e., positive numbers indicate a compatibility
advantage and negative numbers a compatibility disadvantage).
A negative correlation was obtained (r =−0.7, p= 0.003) which
reveals that the slower the participants responded, the more they
showed a compatibility disadvantage.
FIGURE 3 | MeanTRTs (in ms) in Experiment 1 as a function of the factors Sentence-effect compatibility, Action-effect relation, and Sentence type.
Error bars indicate standard errors.
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Table 1 | Mean error rates (in %) and standard errors of error rates (in
parentheses) in Experiment 1.
Concrete sentences Abstract sentences
Compatible Incompatible Compatible Incompatible
Regular action
-effect relation
0.00 (0.00) 0.63 (0.63) 0.00 (0.00) 0.66 (0.66)
Inverted action
-effect relation
0.00 (0.00) 0.63 (0.63) 0.63 (0.63) 0.00 (0.00)
Error rates
In the ANOVA on error rates, no significant effects involving
sentence-effect compatibility were found (all Fs< 1.1). Mean
error rates are given in Table 1.
DISCUSSION
The present experiment addressed the contributions of actions
and intended action effects to the ACE. To this end, actions were
dissociated from their effects and differed in whether they were
directed toward the body or away from the body. In each trial,
participants were instructed about the current direction of the yes
response at sentence onset. The results were different for concrete
and abstract sentences. TRTs for concrete sentences showed a neg-
ative ACE that referred to the action effect, because the data pattern
was the same with the regular and inverted action-effect relations.
Thus, the mental simulation during the comprehension of con-
crete sentences seems to involve representations of action effects.
For abstract sentences, the ACE occurred only in the condition
with inverted action-effect relation, but not in the condition with
regular action-effect relation. Therefore, it cannot be determined
whether the ACE in the inverted condition relied on action or
effect, and no conclusions can be drawn regarding the nature of the
representations activated during the comprehension of abstract
sentences.
A follow-up analysis was conducted to examine whether the
unexpected occurrence of the negative ACE was connected with
response timing. The results suggest that slow responses, which
probably reflect response preparation after the completion of the
sentence, promote the emergence of a negative ACE. This indi-
cates that the relative timing between movement preparation and
sentence comprehension might play a role for the reversal of the
ACE.
Changes in compatibility effects depending on relative timing
have also been observed in other studies. For instance, Richard-
son et al., 2001, Experiment 1) presented participants with a series
of pictured objects that afforded an action on either the left or
the right side. Afterward, participants were asked to press a left
or right key in order to indicate whether they had seen a cer-
tain object or not. Responses were facilitated when the side of the
required keypress was opposite to the side of the action afforded by
the recalled object. This incompatibility effect seemed to depend
on the timing of the responses: when, in a second experiment,
response time data were split into an early and a late half, the late
group, again, exhibited an incompatibility effect between motor
responses and affordances of verbally described objects. The early
group, in contrast, displayed a non-significant tendency toward a
compatibility effect.
To explain their results, Richardson et al. (2001) and Borreg-
gine and Kaschak (2006) drew on the theory of event coding (TEC;
Hommel et al., 2001). TEC suggests that action representations
with overlapping features prime each other when they are acti-
vated at short time intervals (compatibility benefits), but interfere
with each other when they are activated at long intervals (com-
patibility costs). In the light of TEC, compatibility benefits and
costs in the ACE may arise as follows: during online sentence pro-
cessing, feature codes are activated that represent the action that
the sentence content is referring to. Among those feature codes is
the directional code (toward or away from the body). In the first
phase (activation phase), these codes can be activated more eas-
ily for planning another action that shares features with the first
action. If the response is prepared during this activation phase,
access to the activated directional feature code of the described
action is easier. Thus, responding in the same direction is facili-
tated, resulting in compatibility benefits (the standard ACE). At
the end of the sentence, when all relevant information is known,
the activated feature codes are probably bound together to form
a complete representation of the sentence content (which means
running a full simulation of the described action). In this second
phase (integration phase, about 250–500 ms after feature activa-
tion, Stoet and Hommel, 2002), the feature codes can no longer
be activated in isolation. If response planning does not take place
until the sentence is completed, the directional feature code is less
available for coding the response. Thus, responding in the same
direction is impaired, resulting in compatibility costs. This could
account for the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1: a large
part of participants probably held off preparing their response
until the end of the sentence, which caused the negative ACE.
EXPERIMENT 2
Theory of event coding implies that there are mutual interac-
tions between sentence comprehension and response planning.
Therefore, not only should semantic processing of the sentence be
able to facilitate or impair response planning, but also vice versa,
depending on the temporal order of the two processes. In order
to investigate the consequences of the timing between move-
ment preparation and sentence comprehension for the ACE, the
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the onset of sentence
presentation and cue presentation was manipulated in Experiment
2. Moreover, the response cue did not remain on the screen but
was presented only for a short period of time in order to limit
the processing of the response cue to a certain point in time. In
addition to addressing the timing issue, Experiment 2 continued
to pursue the initial question of whether the ACE relies on actions
or on action effects. Thus, again, the spatial relationship between
action and action effect was manipulated.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty German native speakers took part in the experiment in return
for 7 Euros. The data from 10 participants were discarded for the
reasons stated previously, and so analyses were based on the data
from 40 participants (mean age= 24.4 years; 15 males, 25 females).
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All participants were right-handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and audition. They were randomly assigned to
the regular or the inverted action-effect relation condition, each
comprising 20 participants.
Stimuli and apparatus
The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those used in
Experiment 1.
Procedure and design
The procedure and design were the same as in Experiment 1, apart
from the following modifications: the cue signaling the direction
of the yes response in each trial was visible only for 500 ms. The
SOA between sentence onset and the presentation of the response
cue was manipulated within subjects and varied blockwise. In
one of the five SOA conditions, the response cue appeared on the
screen simultaneously with the onset of the sentence presentation
(SOA= 0 ms; as in Experiment 1). In the other conditions, the cue
was presented 1000 ms before sentence onset (SOA=−1000 ms),
500 ms before sentence onset (SOA=−500 ms), 500 ms after sen-
tence onset (SOA= 500 ms), and at the end of the sentence
presentation (SOA= 100% of the sentence length).
At the start of the experiment, participants received 40 trials to
practice the response mode. They then performed 20 trials with
practice sentences. The experimental design was identical to that
of Experiment 1, apart from the additional independent variable
SOA (−1000, −500, 0, 500 ms, 100% of sentence length). The
order of SOA blocks was counterbalanced between participants.
For each participant, an equal number of sentences of each cat-
egory, in each material block, were pseudorandomly assigned to
the SOA conditions in such a way that, across participants, each
combination of effect directions, SOAs, and action-effect relations
contained each sentence with equal frequency.
Data analysis
In the present experiment, median TRTs instead of mean TRTs
were computed for each participant in each condition, because the
additional SOA manipulation resulted in too few data points per
condition to identify and remove outliers. Further, trials with two
particular triads of sentences (one concrete and one abstract) were
excluded from analyses. They were erroneously judged as nonsen-
sical by a large proportion of participants, which led to unbalanced
frequencies of these sentences in the different conditions. Since
there were relatively few data points per condition in this exper-
iment, some conditions did not include any correct response to
these sentences at all, while other conditions did. This could have
distorted the results due to the different sentence lengths. This
resulted in the elimination of 5.0% of the data. Further data analy-
sis was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that the performed
ANOVAs included SOA as an additional within-subjects factor.
RESULTS
Total response time
Mean TRTs are depicted in Figure 4; since no effect of sentence
type was observed in the ANOVA, data are presented averaged
over concrete and abstract sentences. The ANOVA showed a
significant interaction between sentence-effect compatibility and
SOA [F(4, 152)= 4.58, MSE= 23265.86, p= 0.002]. T -tests per-
formed separately for each SOA condition revealed that for the
SOA of 0 ms, responses were faster when sentence direction and
effect direction were compatible (M = 2148, SD= 220) than when
they were incompatible (M = 2215, SD= 213), t (39)=−2.45,
p= 0.02. In contrast, for the SOA of 500 ms, responses were
slower in trials with compatible directions (M = 2178, SD= 217)
than in trials with incompatible directions (M = 2123, SD= 224),
t (39)= 2.5, p= 0.02. Thus, there was a compatibility advantage
when the cue was presented at sentence onset, but when the cue
appeared 500 ms after sentence onset, a compatibility disadvan-
tage occurred. In conditions with SOAs of −1000, −500 ms, and
100% of the sentence length, no significant compatibility effects
were observed (all |t (39)|< 1.8).
Error rates
Mean error rates are shown in Table 2. Again, no effect of sen-
tence type was observed; therefore, data are presented averaged
over the two sentence types. There was a significant interaction
between sentence-effect compatibility and action-effect relation
[F(1, 38)= 8.04, MSE= 38.89, p= 0.007] and a marginally signif-
icant interaction between sentence-effect compatibility and SOA
[F(4, 152)= 2.67, MSE= 50.92, p= 0.06]. However, follow-up
analyses indicated that the only significant difference between
sentence-effect compatibility conditions occurred for the SOA
of −1000 ms in the regular condition [t (19)= 2.63, p= 0.02],
even though the interaction between sentence-effect compati-
bility, action effect relation and SOA did not reach significance
[F(4, 152)= 0.97]. The error rate was higher in the sentence-
effect compatible conditions than in the sentence-effect incom-
patible conditions. Because significant positive or negative ACEs
occurred in different SOA conditions for error rates and for TRTs,
a speed-accuracy trade-off can be ruled out.
DISCUSSION
The aim of Experiment 2 was to look in more detail at the tempo-
ral dynamics of the interaction between the processes of sentence
comprehension and response preparation, in order to investigate
which of the conditions might lead to the emergence of a negative
ACE. First of all, the results indicate that the timing between sen-
tence comprehension and response preparation does indeed affect
whether the ACE is present at all and, if it is present, whether it is
positive or negative. When response planning took place 1000 or
500 ms before sentence onset, the ACE was absent in TRTs. When
response planning and sentence processing started at the same
time, there was a positive ACE in TRTs, whereas the ACE became
negative when response planning was delayed for 500 ms. Finally,
the ACE disappeared again when response planning took place
after the end of the sentence. Because the action-effect relation did
not modulate compatibility effects, data indicate that the ACE is
related to the intended action effect rather than to the action itself.
No significant differences between abstract and concrete sentences
were found.
The positive ACE in the condition with the response cue appear-
ing at sentence onset fits well with the TEC-based explanation of
the ACE: the cue automatically triggers the activation of the indi-
cated directional feature of the response. We assume that response
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FIGURE 4 | MeanTRTs (in ms) in Experiment 2 as a function of Sentence-effect compatibility, SOA, and Action-effect relation (top panel: regular
action-effect relation; bottom panel: inverted action-effect relation). Data are averaged over concrete and abstract sentences. Error bars represent standard
errors.
preparation is completed and feature codes are integrated into
the action plan at about 500 ms after the presentation of the cue,
because this was the approximate amount of time that passed
between the cue presentation at the end of the sentence and the
release of the middle button (response initiation). Regarding sen-
tence comprehension, the direction of the described action is clear
once subject and verb (the first two words in the sentence) are
processed. The end of the verbs lies between 500 ms (for concrete
sentences) and 850 ms (for abstract sentences) after sentence onset.
Because the uniqueness point at which the verb is recognized and
the direction of the described action becomes clear, lies somewhere
before this, there seems to be a temporal overlap of the activation
of the directional code during response planning and sentence
processing. In the sentence-effect compatible condition, priming
occurs between the representation of the sentence content and the
response representation, because both activate the directional fea-
ture code at the same time before it is bound to the one or the other
event. Thereby, the comprehension of the sentence is facilitated,
which leads to a positive ACE.
The result of the negative ACE that occurred when the response
cue was given 500 ms after sentence onset could be explained
similarly to Kaschak and Borreggine’s (2008) interpretation of
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Table 2 | Mean error rates (in %) and standard errors of error rates (in
parentheses) in Experiment 2.
Compatible Incompatible
REGULAR ACTION-EFFECT RELATION
SOA=−1000ms 6.88 (2.37) 1.88 (1.05)
SOA=−500ms 2.29 (1.30) 0.63 (0.63)
SOA=0ms 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
SOA=500ms 0.63 (0.63) 0.63 (0.63)
SOA=100% of the sentence length 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
INVERTED ACTION-EFFECT RELATION
SOA=−1000ms 3.33 (1.68) 3.33 (1.42)
SOA=−500ms 1.25 (0.87) 2.50 (1.50)
SOA=0ms 0.63 (0.63) 3.75 (1.43)
SOA=500ms 0.00 (0.00) 0.83 (0.83)
SOA=100% of the sentence length 0.00 (0.00) 0.63 (0.63)
SOA, stimulus onset asynchrony.
their results: in their experiment, participants were presented with
sentences describing transfer toward the body or away from the
body, and as a secondary task, compatible or incompatible motor
responses had to be executed at different points in time during
sentence processing. They found that a positive ACE arose in
response times when responses were executed at an early point
in the sentences, but disappeared when responses were executed
in the middle of the sentences. Similar to the current experi-
ment, responses that were performed 500 ms after the onset of
sentences whose length and syntax was comparable to our sen-
tences descriptively displayed sentence-effect compatibility costs.
According to the authors, the disappearance of the ACE in the
middle of the sentence results from a rather early running of the
simulation which might be possible because the last part of the sen-
tences is quite predictable. Thus, in our experiment the activated
feature codes may have become integrated into the representa-
tion of the sentence content at an early point within the sen-
tence. This might have impaired the preparation of a compatible
response2.
This explanation also fits well with the finding that the ACE
disappeared in the condition in which the cue was presented at
the end of the sentence: if the directional feature code needed
for planning the response was integrated into the simulation of
the sentence content at the end of the sentence, one would have
expected interference with response preparation and thus a nega-
tive ACE. Yet, if the integration, and with it the temporary binding,
of the directional feature code occurred earlier in the sentence, the
feature code might become available again for response prepa-
ration around the end of the sentence, thereby diminishing the
interference effect.
2Although Kaschak and Borreggine define the ACE in terms of movement, it is
legitimate to compare our results with theirs, because in their study, as well as in our
regular condition, actions and their intended effects were completely correlated and
hence sentence-effect compatibility is the same as sentence-action compatibility.
Because the ACE did not differ significantly between the regular and the inverted
condition in our experiment, the ACE in the inverted condition should also be
comparable to Kaschak and Borreggine’s ACE.
In sum, the results concerning the direction of the ACE
are in line with TEC. In addition, the ACE was related to the
intended action effect rather than to the action itself. This indi-
cates that representations of intended action effects are activated
during the processing of action sentences (regardless of whether
they are concrete or abstract), which is also consistent with
TEC.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
In the present experiments, we were interested in the question
of whether the ACE relies on actions or intended action effects.
Experiment 1 provided no definite answer to this question but,
unexpectedly, showed a negative ACE. Experiment 2 provided evi-
dence that the ACE is related to the intended action effect. Thus,
the comprehension of action descriptions involves the activation
of action representations referring to the intended effects of these
actions. This holds for both concrete and abstract sentences: there
were no systematic effects involving sentence type and (particu-
larly in Experiment 2) the ACE was action effect-related for both
concrete and abstract sentences.
Experiment 2 additionally addressed the role of timing between
sentence comprehension and response preparation in the ACE.
We assumed that the negative ACE that occurred in Experiment
1 is caused by preparing the response rather late in the sentence
when sufficient information is known to simulate the described
action. However, early response preparation was thought to lead
to the positive ACE. Consistent with this assumption, the posi-
tive ACE emerged when response preparation took place at the
beginning of sentence processing, whereas the negative ACE arose
when response preparation took place around the middle of the
sentence. These findings suggest that the positive ACE is a result of
priming between concurrently activated directional feature codes
in sentence processing and response planning. In contrast, the
negative ACE seems to result from interference between the two
processes that probably arises because the directional feature code
is already bound to the simulation of the sentence content and,
thus, is less accessible for response planning.
LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
Our data cannot rule out that, in addition to representations of
intended action effects, motor representations are also involved
in the emergence of the ACE: in some conditions, the ACE was
modulated by action-effect relation. However, the modulation by
action-effect relation reflected that the ACE occurred only in the
inverted action-effect relation condition. It could be that the com-
patibility effect was more pronounced in this condition because
responding was more difficult which resulted in participants con-
centrating more on the direction of the response. Because of this,
the directional feature code might have received stronger activa-
tion, which in turn led to stronger interactions with the respective
feature code activated during sentence comprehension. However,
even though we cannot exclude that motor-related processing of
the action sentences did occur in our study, our results show
that processing according to intended action effects was stronger.
Whether motor programs associated with the described actions
are always activated during sentence comprehension and, if so,
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under which conditions representations of action effects or motor
representations dominate, remains an open question.
Overall, the ACEs we observed were weaker and less reliable
than the effects found in other ACE experiments (e.g., Glenberg
and Kaschak, 2002; Borreggine and Kaschak, 2006; Kaschak and
Borreggine, 2008). One reason for this could be that we investi-
gated the ACE in German instead of in English and that differences
between the languages could have caused differences in the men-
tal simulation during sentence processing. One of the differences
between the English and German linguistic material lies in the sen-
tence construction. In the studies listed above, half of the sentences
used the double-object construction (e.g., “Courtney handed you
the notebook”/“You handed Courtney the notebook”), and half
used the dative construction (e.g., “Andy delivered the pizza to
you”/“You delivered the pizza to Andy”), whereas our German sen-
tences were only in the double-object form (e.g., “Andrea bringt
dir die Pizza”/“Du bringst Andrea die Pizza”). This was due to
the fact that the dative form is not very common in the Ger-
man language, and for most of the verbs used it would actually
be grammatically wrong. Following the linguistic focus hypoth-
esis (Taylor and Zwaan, 2008), this dative form, especially, may
give rise to a strong ACE: in this construction, the recipient is
postponed to the end of the sentence, whereby the direction of
transfer is brought back into the attentional focus at this late
point of processing. The renewed activation of the directional
feature code around the end of the sentence may enable prim-
ing of a compatible response even when response preparation
occurs rather late. In contrast, in the German sentences the focus
is shifted to the transferred object and not to the direction of
transfer at the end of the sentences. This may also contribute
to the particular temporal dynamics of the ACE observed in
Experiment 2.
COMPARISONWITH RELATED THEORIES
The present findings are compatible with the TEC (Hommel et al.,
2001) and, on closer inspection, they are also compatible with the
indexical hypothesis by Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000). The
theory of perceptual symbol systems by Barsalou (1999) appears
to be incompatible with the finding that representations of action
effects are activated during the comprehension of action sentences.
The correspondence of our results with the common coding
approach and with TEC can be explained as follows: extend-
ing those theories to linguistic stimuli, we make the additional
assumption (following embodied approaches to language compre-
hension) that semantic meaning of linguistic stimuli is represented
in the same format as the perceptual and action events these stim-
uli refer to. Assuming that the meaning of actions is represented
in terms of the intended action effects, it can be claimed that the
semantic representations of action words and sentences are shaped
by the goals or effects of the described actions. Because of these
shared representations of action-related language and real actions,
compatibility effects arise between linguistic stimuli and intended
action effects. This was confirmed by the appearance of the action
effect-related ACE in Experiment 2. The negative ACE and the
related time-course of the ACE that we observed in Experiment
2 appear to be broadly consistent with the mechanisms of code
activation and integration proposed by TEC.
Similar to the positive ACE, compatibility benefits due to acti-
vated codes are also reflected in interactions between language
processing and actions that were already mentioned in the intro-
duction (e.g., Boulenger et al., 2006; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006):
the representation of the word meaning activates feature codes
which then prime feature-overlapping responses. Similar to the
negative ACE, compatibility costs due to integrated codes have
been shown, for example, between perceptual and action-planning
processes (Müsseler and Hommel, 1997): perceptual performance
was impaired – the identification of a briefly presented and masked
arrow pointing to the left or right – when concurrently preparing
a movement that was spatially compatible with the stimulus.
Furthermore, we follow TEC in assuming that the shared rep-
resentations referring to intended action effects reside on a higher
cognitive level. According to Hommel et al. (2001), this is because
the activation of representations of intended action effects (dis-
tal representations) is assumed to be the initial step in action
planning – the more abstract premotor component – and is a pre-
requisite for selecting the appropriate motor codes (for evidence
for shared high-level representations of perception and action see,
e.g., Massen and Prinz, 2007). In line with this, some authors
propose that more abstract, higher-level action representations
might be involved in understanding action-related language (e.g.,
Zwaan, 1999; de Vega, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2008). According to
Zwaan and colleagues (Zwaan, 1999; Taylor and Zwaan, 2009),
representations evoked by verbal descriptions can be embodied to
different degrees: depending on the existence of one’s own visual
or motor experience, the mental representation of the described
situation can be rich or poor, detailed or coarse. For example,
descriptions of actions that are not part of one’s own action reper-
toire (such as specific sports) cannot be simulated in detail, and
hence the motor system is only slightly involved in their com-
prehension. Such coarse simulations may draw on higher-level
action representations; this might even apply to descriptions of
familiar actions when their details remain unspecified (de Vega,
2008).
The finding of the action effect-related ACE contradicts the the-
ory of perceptual symbol systems suggested by Barsalou (1999).
According to this theory, linguistic descriptions evoke multimodal
representations of their referents, that is, they reactivate associ-
ated experiences that are simulated solely by modality-specific
systems. In the case of action sentences, mainly experiences of
motor states should be simulated. Thus, this approach predicts
priming of low-level motor programs (i.e., a movement-related
ACE), and it cannot therefore account for the occurrence of the
action effect-related ACE.
Similar to Barsalou’s (1999) theory, the indexical hypothesis
by Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000) also assumes that the
words in a sentence activate low-level modal representations of
referential objects and actions of the words. Yet, beyond that, the
indexical hypothesis proposes two additional processes of sentence
comprehension which allow to account for the present results:
affordances are derived from these representations, that is, the
comprehender gains access to potential motor interactions with
the referential objects. As a next step, the affordances are com-
bined or meshed into a coherent, executable, and imaginable set
of actions. This meshing process is guided by the meaning of the
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syntactic construction. For instance, double-object constructions
evoke the notion that an agent (Subject) transfers an object or
something more abstract (Object2) to a recipient (Object1), that
is, they activate a schema for giving (Goldberg,2003). Thus, syntac-
tic constructions are assumed to activate more generalized action
schemas or higher-order action representations (see also Bergen
et al., 2004; Feldman and Narayanan, 2004). Correspondingly, the
finding of the action effect-related ACE can be explained by the
indexical hypothesis in the following way: for one thing, through
the meaning of the syntactic construction, processing a transfer
sentence activates a certain transfer goal (the action effect). For
another thing, affordances are derived depending on current goals
and the learning history of the comprehender. If the comprehen-
der has learned that, in the current situation, an action effect in
a certain direction can only be achieved by making a movement
in the opposite direction, then processing a transfer sentence also
activates a movement representation opposite to the direction of
transfer. In this way, an action effect-related ACE can occur that
relies on both high-level distal representations and low-level motor
representations. The indexical hypothesis is therefore consistent
with the present results, which point to the importance of high-
level representations, as well as with previous results, which point
to the importance of motor-level action representations in the
comprehension of action-related language (e.g., Glenberg et al.,
2008a,b; for a more elaborate account see Glenberg and Gallese,
2012).
CONCLUSION
Altogether, our findings confirm the close coupling of cog-
nition and action and provide further evidence for the
embodied approach to language comprehension. The pre-
sented results revealed that the comprehension of linguis-
tic descriptions of actions involves the activation of higher-
order action representations referring to distal effects of these
actions.
Moreover, the results indicate that interactions between (declar-
ative) sentence comprehension and (procedural) response selec-
tion are highly sensitive to the temporal relationship between the
two kinds of processes.
In conclusion, our results suggest that declarative and pro-
cedural modes of action processing are less different from each
other than is often thought. While they may differ in terms of
concomitant mental experiences, they seem to be fairly equiva-
lent in terms of underlying functional mechanisms. They inter-
act with each other and draw on common representational
resources, to the effect that high-level processes such as sen-
tence processing can influence action unconsciously. Thus, within
the limits of the present paradigm, we can account for our
experimental observations without assigning a particular func-
tional (or even causal) role to conscious awareness. However,
we do not mean to generalize this conclusion beyond the lim-
its of our paradigm. Other paradigms may invite other kinds of
conclusions.
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